Response to Situationist’s Article on Postmodernism
by jiffylube
Posted to WritersAndGenres on 2003-08-10 12:32:00
Although Monsieur Situationist (I will refer to him as S. from now on), has a decent grasp of the history of Western metaphysics and its relationship to deconstructionism, there are quite a few major aspects of the philosophical tradition that he glosses over; for instance, Kant’s critical response to the skepticism of Hume. Though correct in pointing out the relationship of post-modernism and existentialist phenomenology to Hegel (not necessarily a good thing), he fails to mention the fact that philosophy departments–at least in the USA and Britain–are mostly occupied by people who work in the tradition of the analytical/positivist school or language philosophy. He also downplays, I believe, the marxist or neo-marxist aspects of post-modernism, evident, for better or worse, in such figures as Foucault.
At least at this stage in his “Derrida for Beatniks 101,” S. has also neglected to address many of the serious criticisms of deconstructionism brought forth not only from expected conservative-moralist types but from leftists, scientists and linguists. The main objection that many quite respectable scholars have raised (such as Noam Chomsky) is that the obscure, inaccessible and parodic nature of Derrida’s writing prevents most humans, even philosophy graduate students, from clearly understanding his theory (or anti-theory). Derrida thus rejects Descartes’ own maxim of clear and distinct ideas—though Derrida may be following Sartre’s model perhaps in his ability to generate thick impenetrable prose, a common trait of continental metaphysicians such as Heidegger and Hegel as well.
I have not mastered deconstructionism, but a major tenet seems to be that we can know nothing about the true nature of reality. The deconstructionist asserts that reality (and by extension all aspects of reality such as language, science, politics, etc.) is a “social construct.” Obviously this is a rather radical and solipsistic point of view. Perhaps language is inherently ambiguous and words have no inate truth, yet making the leap from acknowledging ambiguities and problems of meaning and reference in language to asserting we can know nothing about reality as a whole is incredibly broad and absurd.
The periodic table is not an arbitrarily constructed “text”; the elements are not part of a subjective discourse. The names (e.g. Sodium, Hydrogen, Potassium Chlorate. etc) may depend on some linguistic terminology, but anyone who has stepped beyond freshmen level science classes realizes that the terms are more or less variables—-words functioning as referents to qualities that exist in the natural world. The words could be changed, just as variables could be replaced , but that which is being referred to remains. Referring to the history of physical science as it were some literary text is insulting, petty and reveals Derrida’s typical suspicion of rationality.
Another central tenet of deconstructionism, mentioned by S., is that language has no inherent meaning. Yet at its most basic level, this idea seems prima facie mistaken. If this was true, then how could anyone ever agree with deconstructionist writers? How could deconstructionist writers themselves disagree with others? Humans may be prisoners of langauge to some extent, but if one investigates just a modicum of logic and the analtyical/positivist tradition of philosophy (an aspect of philosophy completely overlooked by S.) , one realizes that, apart from emotive and performative aspects (such as poetry really) words function as referents, as variables which point to some tanglible quality or state in the natural world. Words make up statements or propositions, and propostions are true in so far as they are capable of being verified.
Does Derrida deny this? Or is he asserting there is some “hegemony” in logic itself—-there may be elitists teaching in the philosophy departments, but this is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of particular propositions or to the workings of our circulatory system, our nervous system or the internal combustion engine that provides a means for Professor Parlor Esthete to go back and forth from Café de Beatnique to cushy tenured niche in Academe…..
Another central issue is that for the deconstructionist, the meaning of words is limitless—that since the meaning of words (I guess that the deconstructionist would be referring to just semantical meaning—for a word, though somewhat ambiguous in meaning, might function both syntactically and logically—read Chomsky’s “Aspects of the Theory of Syntax” for elucidation on this point) are indefinite then language is ultimately unstable. There is perhaps some merit in this sort of argument, but the positivists were addressing the problems and ambiguities of language a hundred years ago. That is why symbolic language was implemented by analytical philosophers such as Russell and Carnap; and in a sense that is a good reason why programmers make use of artificial languages where subject and predicate can be precisely defined— in fact, the philosopher Quine argued in various places for a “lingua franca” which would eliminate semantical ambiguity (though many literary types revel in ambiguity and connotation).
“Deconstructionism is the result of philosophers being shocked to learn that reality is not Platonic (e.g., races are no more sharply defined than are extended families) and thus deciding to give up believing in reality rather than in Platonism.”
